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222 Abstract
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, macroprudential measures were 
labelled as policymakers’ best response to systemic risk and macro-financial 
imbalances, with their effectiveness still largely unknown due to limited use of 
such measures. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the potentials and limita-
tions of these measures by evaluating both the immediate and the overall impact 
of macroprudential policies on banks’ lending to the non-financial private sector 
in Croatia. The findings reveal the divergent impact of macroprudential measures 
on banks’ lending with regards to their direction, i.e. tightening or loosening. 
Policy makers should bear this in mind when opting for a tightening of their policy 
stance as the reversal of that action may not match the initial impact of its intro-
duction. Additionally, from a policymaker perspective, this paper provides poten-
tial evidence of cross-border policy spillovers, which should be taken into account 
in order to conduct an effective macroprudential policy.
Keywords: bank lending, cross-border policy spillovers, effectiveness, impact 
study analysis, limitations, macroprudential measures, potential, systemic risk
1 INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis showed that excessive bank lending can lead to impaired 
financial stability, which, if not addressed promptly and adequately, can have seri-
ous economic and social costs. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the under-
lying drivers of credit growth, especially in the case of emerging market econo-
mies with bank-centric financial systems, such as Croatia, where credit is the pre-
dominant channel of financial transmission. The impact of macroprudential (MP) 
policy actions on bank lending has gained in importance in the post-crisis period, 
as growing numbers of authorities have recognised the limitations of conventional 
policies in safeguarding financial stability and decided to take their policy toolbox 
into more unconventional, i.e. macroprudential territory. 
Following the growing body of literature that recognizes both the importance of 
credit flows for the smooth functioning of the economy and their potential for 
major disruptions if proven to be unsustainable, numerous central banks put the 
preservation of financial stability among their main goals. In the pre-crisis period 
the vast majority of macroprudential measures were conducted by developing 
countries and were oriented at taming rapid and excessive credit growth. The 
introduction and application of macroprudential measures among developed 
countries intensified only after the crisis and with the introduction of the Basel III 
framework. Nevertheless, as these measures are still rather a new phenomenon, 
little is known about their effectiveness and they are still under-researched (Claes-
sens, Kose and Terrones, 2011).
The macroprudential experience of Croatia from the beginning of 2000 is espe-
cially rich and still relatively unexplored. The Croatian National Bank (CNB) is 
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223on the use of countercyclical macroprudential policy in order to smooth out the 
financial cycle and safeguard the stability of the banking system (Lim et al., 2011; 
Dumičić, 2017; Budnik and Kleibl, 2018a). In the years preceding the global finan-
cial crisis, the CNB employed a great variety of measures in order to limit rapid 
credit growth and to increase the resilience of the financial system. Therefore, 
Croatia is an interesting candidate for a case study on the analysis of the potential 
effect of macroprudential policies on credit growth. Given the high share of for-
eign-owned banks1 in the Croatian financial system (Figure 1), we investigate 
whether some differential effects of macroprudential policies can be observed for 
domestic and foreign banks. Differences in the business practices of foreign and 
domestic banks are well documented in the literature (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga 2001; Kraft, 2002; De Haas and Lelyveld, 2006; Arakelyan, 2018), 
but the effects of macroprudential policies on their lending are still underexplored, 
which motivated us to differentiate the analysis on these two subsamples of banks.
Furthermore, taking into account the share of foreign banks in the Croatian finan-
cial system, the prudential policies conducted by authorities from countries that 
represent the home countries of foreign credit institutions should also matter 
(Emter, Schmitz and Tirpak, 2018). We shall explore the possible existence of 
outward macroprudential policy spillovers, which can be defined as effects of a 
macroprudential policy action carried out by foreign country on the domestic 
economy (ESRB, 2014). Therefore, we also include in the model the macropru-
dential stance of home authorities of Croatian banks in foreign ownership and 
explore their effects on lending activities in Croatia.
Figure 1 















































































Foreign owned banks Share of foreign owned banks (right)
Private domestic banks
Source: CNB.
1 In the late 1990s, the government decided to privatize banks. Consequently, the share of foreign owned 
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224 A micro data set containing highly granular supervisory data collected by the Cro-
atian National Bank, spanning 19 years and taking in 31 banks is utilized in the 
analysis. The immediate impact of MP measures on bank lending was estimated 
on high-frequency 10-day data by employing event study analysis. To assess the 
overall effect of MP measures on bank lending, we used a fixed effects panel 
model on quarterly data; panel regression is particularly valuable as it allows us to 
examine the effects of macroprudential actions while also controlling for idiosyn-
cratic characteristics of banks, unobserved heterogeneity among banks, and mac-
roeconomic developments. We also looked for any shifts in bank behaviour during 
the crisis by looking at the pre-crisis and crisis periods separately.
Event study analysis reveals the asymmetric impact of MP measures with respect 
to direction, as the introduction of tightening MP measures had a statistically sig-
nificant impact on banks’ lending, whereas loosening MP actions of the central 
bank did not cause a significant shift in banks’ lending behaviour. The results 
show that a few periods prior to the introduction of policy tightening measures, 
banks reacted procyclically, that is they increased their lending in anticipation of 
regulatory tightening. Through a series of estimations, we find that the regulatory 
environment was one of the major factors influencing lending in Croatia, and that 
this effect varies depending on individual bank ownership characteristics. Our 
findings suggest that the tightening of the aggregate macroprudential policy stance 
in Croatia primarily influenced foreign banks’ lending and had only a limited 
effect on domestic banks. In addition, we provide some preliminary evidence for 
policy spillovers from regulatory policies in other European countries on lending 
activity in Croatia. Results show that regulatory spillovers are not only present 
through a direct parent-daughter channel, but also through indirect channels. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the related litera-
ture. Section 3 describes the dataset and methodology used in empirical analysis. 
In section 4 the main results are presented and, finally, section 5 concludes.
2 LITERATURE OVERVIEW
Although the popularity of macroprudential measures has greatly increased since 
the global financial crisis, a proper evaluation of the effectiveness of these kinds 
of policies is still rather scarce. On one hand, in developing countries, where expe-
rience with the use of macroprudential policies is richer, there are still restrictions 
in terms of data availability thus limiting the possibility of evaluating the effects 
of different policies. On the other hand, in many developed countries macropru-
dential measures have been introduced only in response to the recent crisis, which 
also makes it difficult to assess empirically their effectiveness and transmission 
channels. Even if the literature on the effectiveness of macroprudential policies is 
still in an early stage, there is an increasing interest in evaluating the impact of 
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225In the theoretical literature related to evaluation of the impact of macroprudential 
policies on different economic dimensions, authors mostly use Dynamic Stochas-
tic General Equilibrium Models (DSGE). Most of their findings show that macro-
prudential policies have a potential role in dampening the credit cycles and that 
they are more effective if used to complement monetary policies (Angelini, Neri 
and Panetta, 2011; Agénor, Alper and da Silva, 2012; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 
2014 etc.).
The empirical literature dealing with assessments of the impact of macropruden-
tial policies on a wide array of economic variables of interest can broadly be 
divided into several areas depending on the information used. One strand of the 
literature employs aggregate information at the country level, where most of the 
papers have used aggregate macro data to evaluate the impact of different policies 
on some variable of interest like credit growth, housing prices or macroeconomic 
variables and they commonly use panel data regressions at the country level or 
event studies. They find that the tightening of macroprudential policies is associ-
ated with lower bank credit growth and house price inflation (Bruno, Shim and 
Shim, 2015; Cerutti, Claesens and Laeven, 2017; Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey, 
2018) and that these effects appear to be smaller in more financially developed 
and open economies (Cerutti, Claesens and Laeven, 2017). Moreover, macropru-
dential policies seem to be more successful when they complement monetary 
policy by reinforcing monetary tightening than when they act in opposite direc-
tions (Bruno, Shim and Shim, 2015). Regarding the second strand of the literature, 
authors use information at bank level to evaluate the impact of various macropru-
dential policies on individual banking indicators. Authors have mainly found that 
borrower-based measures like loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income (DTI) 
caps seem to be somewhat more effective than capital requirements in containing 
credit growth (Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018; Claessens, Ghosh and Mihet, 
2013 and Lim et al., 2011). Other than that, Cerutti, Claesens and Laeven (2017) 
find negative effects of dynamic provisioning, reserve requirement measurements, 
limits on FX loans, and concentration limits on credit growth. Other papers find 
that the implementation of macroprudential policies can generate spillover effects. 
For instance, Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2014) study the effects of bank cap-
ital regulation in the UK and found that regulated banks reduce lending in response 
to tighter capital requirements while at the same time unregulated banks increase 
lending. More recently, to estimate the impact of macroprudential policies authors 
have used information that is more granular at the bank-debtor relationship level 
or credit registry data but there are still relatively few papers in the literature that 
have used this information to evaluate certain policies. For example, Jiménez et al. 
(2015) examine the effect of countercyclical provisions on credit growth in Spain 
and find that they were successful in reducing the effects of a credit crunch but 
they were not as successful in curbing the pre-crisis credit boom. 
Empirical studies focusing on the effects of regulatory policies on specific institu-
















































































44 (2) 221-249 (2020)
226 focused on their role on financial stability and transmission channels of shocks. 
Papers focusing on the period prior to the crisis find evidence of a stabilizing role 
of foreign banks as they are a source of diversification and act as a shock absorber 
during local crises (De Haas and van Lelyveld, 2006; Arena, Reinhart and 
Vazquez, 2007; Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2011; Cull, Martínez Pería and Verrier, 
2017). In the post-crisis studies, foreign ownership of banks showed a more diver-
gent face. Some authors find supporting evidence for the view that foreign banks 
can act as a source of contagion, increase volatility and import economic or finan-
cial shocks from home to host countries (Cull and Martinez Peria, 2013; Cull, 
Martínez Pería and Verrier, 2017). Arakelyan (2018) adds to this strand of litera-
ture by using data on 16 CESEE economies and stresses the importance of moni-
toring the health of foreign parent banks as well as the potential regulatory changes 
in their home jurisdictions. On the other hand, authors also find that in some coun-
tries foreign banks continue to support a high overall degree of banking sector 
stability (Barboni, 2017).
For the case of Croatia, there are several papers but they mostly consider various 
aspects of credit growth analysis (Čeh, Dumičić and Krznar, 2011; Pintarić, 2016; 
Dumičić and Ljubaj, 2017). Other than that, some papers also discuss the role of 
policy makers on credit growth. Ljubaj (2012) confirmed the existence of a long-
run relation between household loans, the macroeconomic environment factor and 
the monetary policy indicator, while no such relation was confirmed for corporate 
loans. The author concluded that it was probably due to the fact that enterprises 
raised substantial funds from abroad, while households were financed predomi-
nantly by domestic banks. Furthermore, Dumičić’s (2017) estimation shows that 
macroprudential policies in CEE countries, including Croatia, were more effec-
tive in slowing credit to households than credit to the non-financial corporate 
(NFC) sector. This again can be attributed to the NFC sector’s having had access 
to non-bank and cross-border credit in addition to domestic bank credit. 
Even though, the issue of effects of regulatory policies on lending dynamics in Cro-
atia is not new in the literature, we re-examine it by conducting an extensive analy-
sis focusing on differences between foreign and domestically owned banks and by 
introducing a novel variable that takes into account the impact of the regulatory 
environment on credit intermediation, namely the macroprudential stance index.
Literature that employs event-study methodology to assess the impact of central 
banks’ actions mainly focuses on the impact these measures have on financial mar-
kets. In recent years this stream of literature predominantly focussed on the impact 
of the ECBs’ unconventional monetary policy on financial conditions in the Euro 
Area (Ambler and Rumler, 2017; Briciu and Lisi, 2015; McQuade, Falagiarda and 
Tirpák, 2015; Rivolta, 2014). To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper 
that deals with the issue of the immediate impact of macroprudential measures on 
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2273 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 EXPERIENCE WITH MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES IN CROATIA
The beginning of the 2000s in Croatia was marked by rapid credit growth, which 
lasted until 2008. Conditions that contributed to the strong growth can be found in 
stable inflation and stable exchange rates that lowered the risk perception of the 
Croatian economy which, accompanied by a widened gap between expected 
return on investment in Croatia and the EU, attracted foreign capital and therefore 
positively contributed to credit growth (Rohatinski, 2015). Moreover, competition 
between banks for new clients became fiercer, as Croatia was seen as a country 
with a big financial deepening potential. On the demand side, the tendency towards 
spending and consumption was rapidly growing in both public and private sectors. 
Therefore, all the preconditions were met for the rapid credit expansion that fol-
lowed. In the 2000-2003 period, according to CNB data, bank credit grew on 
average by 23.7% on a yearly basis, which was mainly financed by foreign capital 
inflows (Figure 2).
Figure 2 







































































Real GDP Real estate price index
Real credit growth to HH & NFCs Stock exchange index (right)
Sources: CBS and CNB.
In 2003, it was obvious that a lending boom was underway in Croatia and what is 
more, it was followed by increasing asset prices, implying the creation of a vicious 
cycle between financial and macroeconomic aggregates. Specifically, credit 
expansion led to increased asset prices, and this encouraged investors and raised 
the value of collateral, which furthermore fuelled credit growth (Figure 2). The 
central bank decided to act with a broad set of relatively unconventional measures, 
which at that time were not even known as “macroprudential”, in order to curb 
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228 measures instead of more conventional monetary tightening measures. The inher-
ent characteristics of domestic economy with respect to size, openness, high 
euroization level, strong capital inflows and relatively high foreign indebtedness 
severely limited the scope for a conventional monetary policy. This was addition-
ally boosted by global developments characterized by financial liberalization, 
convergence process of emerging markets, high global liquidity and low risk aver-
sion. In order to address these issues, different measures were implemented, but 
those used the most frequently were related to limits to credit growth and volume 
(Figure 3). The most important pre-crisis measures were the high level of the gen-
eral reserve requirement, administrative restriction of loan growth, introduction of 
marginal reserve requirements, special reserve requirement and minimum required 
foreign currency claims. Other than that, the CNB increased capital requirements 
for currency induced credit risk and capital adequacy requirements. For more 
details about the macroprudential policy of the CNB in the pre-crisis period, the 
reader is referred to Kraft and Galac (2011), Dumičić and Šošić (2014), Dumičić 
(2017) and Vujčić and Dumičić (2016). 
Figure 3











































Other and with ambiguous impact Policy loosening Policy tightening
Note: Macroprudential measures are grouped into the instrument categories following defini-
tions in Budnik and Kleibl (2018a). 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on CNB.
Other than in Croatia, a somewhat greater use of macroprudential policies in the 
pre-crisis period can also be observed in Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries2 than elsewhere in Europe which is largely explained by the financial 
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229sector structure and the overall level of financial development in these countries 
(Figure 4). Other than the use of a great variety of macroprudential tools within 
countries, the data also show that CEE countries were active in changing the 
intensity of measures as well and Croatia is again one of the most active countries. 
Nonetheless, empirical studies focusing on the nature of macroprudential policies 
find evidence that only a few CEE countries in pre-crisis period used countercycli-
cal macroprudential policies. These countries are Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania 
(Lim et al., 2011; Dumičić, 2017; Budnik and Kleibl, 2018a). 
Macroprudential measures were able to partially slow down the accumulation of 
systemic risk, while strengthening banks’ resiliency through a build-up of liquid-
ity and capital buffers. It should also be noted that the efficiency of these measures 
was partially reduced due to their circumvention through the less regulated parts 
of the financial system or by the transference of operations from local banks to 
their parent banks. They also motivated banks to raise capital rather than borrow 
from abroad (Kraft and Galac, 2011; Vujčić and Dumičić, 2016). As a result of all 
these efforts, the Croatian banking system did not experience the fate of some 
other banking systems, as it remained sound, resilient and without major bank 
failures throughout the global financial crisis. After the onset of the global finan-
cial crisis, the CNB gradually released the previously accumulated reserves and 
credit growth restrictions were removed. Despite the fact that Croatia sidestepped 
the financial crisis in 2008, the economy experienced the longest recession of all 
EU countries; it lasted for six years until 2015. On the other hand, credit growth 
has only recently showed signs of recovery. 
Figure 4 
Frequency of policy actions by objective of the policy measure for CEE countries, 
2000-2018
2000-2008 2009-2018















Other and with ambiguous impact Policy loosening Policy tightening
Note: More details about policy action definitions in Budnik and Kleibl (2018a). 
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230 3.2 DATA 
To evaluate the effects of aforementioned macroprudential policies on domestic 
and foreign banks’ lending we use supervisory data reported by banks operating in 
Croatia at the unconsolidated level. The use of unconsolidated data enables us to 
explore solely developments in the domestic market, which is in the focus of this 
paper. The event study analysis of MP measures’ impact was estimated on the 
most frequent available (10-day) data, while panel regression analysis was 
employed on quarterly data. This data is highly granular and it allows us to use a 
wide number of variables to control for various factors of banking activity. Other 
than that, we use the different macroeconomic variables reported by the different 
institutions, such as CBS, EC, CNB, etc.
This analysis focuses on a 19 year-period (December 1999 to September 2018) by 
using a panel dataset covering 31 banks. We impose the restriction that a bank 
must have been present in the market for at least half of the observed time period 
to enter into the sample. As not all banks were active during the overall observed 
period, the resulting panel is unbalanced. Furthermore, in panel regression analy-
sis simple outlier treatment to dataset is applied. We eliminate outliers3 from the 
sample across banks and time periods if the value of the annual credit growth to 
private sector exceeds 100%.
3.3 METHODOLOGY
3.3.1 EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS
The immediate impact of CNB macroprudential policies on banks’ lending is esti-
mated by applying event study methodology, where we check for a potential dif-
ferential impact on domestic and foreign banks by splitting up the sample into two 
subsamples. We also differentiate according to policy action direction as we sepa-
rately estimate the impact of tightening, loosening and other measures with 
ambiguous impact. In order to setup the event-study methodology, certain facets 
of the study design have to be specified. First off, we have to define what consti-
tutes an event. Because MP actions of the CNB in certain instances occurred in 
clusters (i.e. they occurred in the same month), we treat the interventions in the 
same cluster as a single event. When this definition of an intervention cluster is 
used, the sample of events is reduced to 54 out of the initial 113 events. We assume 
that the direction of that event is tightening if more tightening measures occurred 
than loosening measures and vice versa. Next, we have to define the length of an 
event window on which the effect of MP measures’ introduction on banks’ lending 
is tested. Longer event windows allow for the possibility of a more gradual effect 
of an event, but at the same time banks’ lending can be influenced by other drivers 
over longer event windows. We chose a window that starts 6 periods (2 months) 
before the event and ends 6 periods after the event. Moreover, in order to measure 
the effect of an event on bank lending, we have to calculate abnormal growth rates 
3 The number of eliminated outliers amounted to 26, which represents around 1.2% of total observations in 
the full sample. Furthermore, eliminated outliers were scattered across both time and bank dimensions of the 
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231of bank loans to the non-financial private sector at individual bank level. We 
define them as the difference between observed growth rates and the “normal” 
growth rates of bank lending. For the estimation of normal growth rates, we chose 
the mean adjusted returns model which assumes that the expected growth rate of 
loans in the event window differs across banks and is equal to the average return 
of a bank observed in the estimation window, which in our case is defined as 36 
periods (1 year) prior to event window. Even though the mean adjusted returns 
model is relatively simple compared to other models, Brown and Warner (1980; 
1985) show that results based on this model do not systematically deviate from 
results based on more sophisticated models in short-term event studies. Finally, 
the statistical significance of MP events at period τ are estimated on cumulative 
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where τ ∈{–6, 6} is a period from event window, Nτ is a number of banks active 
at date corresponding to period τ, CAGRiτ is cumulative abnormal growth rate of 
bank i in period τ, AGRiτ, NGRiτ and GRiτ are respectively abnormal, normal and 
the observed 10-day growth rates of bank i loans to non-financial private sector in 
period τ.
3.3.2 PANEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS
In order to estimate the through-the-cycle effect of the cumulative macropruden-
tial stance we use a panel regression model as panel data, with their cross-sec-
tional and time dimensions, provides us with the necessary variability in data that 
is indispensable to be able to estimate the impact of macro variables such as 
macroprudential policy stance on bank lending, while avoiding the occurrence of 
spurious regression. Additionally, a panel data model allows us to test the hypoth-
esis that the macroprudential policy actions of a central bank unevenly affect 
domestic and foreign banks by splitting the full sample into two subsamples. Spe-
cifically, we use panel regressions with fixed effects4, since fixed effects estima-
tion allows for arbitrary correlation between the unobserved bank specifics and 
the observed explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2002). Furthermore, under the 
assumption of strict exogeneity, it also takes into account bank-specific differ-
ences. We prefer a static to a dynamic model due to the relatively low correlation 
between current and lagged values of credit growth. The static panel data model 
with fixed effects can be specified as:
 Ci,t = α + βXit + γZt + δMPPt + ui + εi,t , (2)
4 The Hausman test was performed and statistical evidence for the use of fixed effects approach was found. 
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232 where the subscripts i and t are indices for bank and time, Ci,t denotes the depend-
ent variable (quarterly credit growth on annual basis), α is the intercept, MPPt 
captures the overall macroprudential policy stance of the country, Xit is a vector of 
bank specific variables, Zt is a vector of macro variables, ui is a bank fixed effect 
that enables us to control for unobserved bank-level characteristics and εi,t is the 
idiosyncratic error term. 
In order to check for any unspecified macro effect, time specific fixed effects are 
included in complementary specifications:
 Ci,t = α + βXit + ui + λt + εi,t , (3)
where, along with other variables mentioned above, λt captures time fixed effects.
Depending on the model specification, the exact choice of control variables dif-
fers. In order to minimize any endogeneity problems between explanatory bank 
specific variables and the dependent variable, we lag all RHS variables by four 
quarters. To control for possible multicollinearity issues between regressors, we 
include highly correlated variables in separate model specifications. We use bank-
level clustered, robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. Any pos-
sible shift in banks behaviour in the crisis5 period, relative to the pre-crisis period, 
is also examined in this paper. We use December 2008 as a cut-off date based on 
Wald structural break test6.
3.4 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
The dependent variable of interest is the year on year real credit growth to house-
holds and non-financial corporation sectors, i.e. the private sector. The nominal 
growth rate of credit to the private sector calculated from balance sheet stocks can 
be highly influenced by non-performing loan write-offs and, in the case of a bank-
ing system that is characterized by a high share of foreign currency lending such 
as the Croatian, by sudden changes in exchange rates. Therefore, in order to cap-
ture “pure credit growth”, data on nominal credit growth was cleansed from these 
effects. Additionally, this variable is transformed into real terms to correct for the 
effect of price level change on lending (Figure 5). 
5 We refer to the whole period from 2009Q1 to 2018Q3 as the crisis period, although not all this period can 
be considered as crisis. The recession in Croatia lasted until 2015 and credit activity has been showing signs 
of recovery since 2017 (only on transactional basis). 
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233Figure 5 




































































Nominal credit growth w/o exchange rate movements and write-offs
Real credit growth w/o exchange rate movements and write-offs
Source: CNB.
In the measurement of policy intensity, several options are possible. The macro-
prudential policy index can be represented as a dummy variable, a number of 
instruments in place or as a cumulated index of net tightening. In this setting, the 
aggregate index used characterizes the macroprudential policy stance of a country 
by cumulating the number of tightening and easing events since end-1999 (Akinci 
and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018; Budnik and Kleibl, 2018a), which can be defined as:
 
[ ] [ ]0 0, ,
 ,t t t t tMPP T Lτ ττ τ∈ ∈= −∑ ∑  (4)
where Tτ is the number of tightening measures introduced in quarter τ, Lτ is num-
ber of loosening measures introduced in quarter τ and t0 denotes the end of 1999 
as a starting point in the sample. MPP stance_HR represents the simple CNB 
macroprudential policy stance (MPP stance) index. 
As the goal of this research is to find some evidence on whether macroprudential 
measures had a significant effect in reducing bank risk-taking we employ this 
aggregate macroprudential policy stance. By using the simple index, we have 
overcome the problem of heterogeneity of instruments and multi-dimensionality 
of their calibration. At the same time, the information from higher precision of the 
measurement are not taken into account. As this paper assesses mostly the time 
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234 The index is created according to the ECB’s Macroprudential Policies Evaluation 
Database (MaPPED7). An increase in the constructed index signals net tightening 
while decline signals net loosening of macroprudential stance (Figure 6). Further-
more, in the sub-sample of foreign banks we also consider the evolution of MPP 
stance in countries that represent home countries for foreign credit institutions 
operating in Croatia (MPP_stance_Home) to check for possible macroprudential 
policy outward spillovers from foreign banks’ home authorities. We also check for 
possible macroprudential policy spillovers from foreign countries onto domestic 
banks by constructing the variable of the MPP stance of EU countries constructed 
as the weighted average of individual countries’ macroprudential policy stances, 
where the annual GDPs of the respective economies are used as weights.
Figure 6 














































































Croatia Austria Italy Hungary France EU_average
Introduction of Basel
Note: Data include all policy actions implemented or in force during 1999-2018 for Croatia, 
several other home countries and average index for all 28 EU countries. MPP stance per coun-
try represents a cumulative net tightening value (tightening minus loosening) of actions across 
years. December 31st, 1999 was set at zero for all observed countries to have comparable evo-
lution over time.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on CNB and ECB (MaPPED).
As mentioned above we divide control variables into two groups: macroeconomic 
and bank-specific variables. Descriptive statistics of bank-specific variables for 
the two bank sub-samples and the whole are given in Table 1. 
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2353.4.1 MACROECONOMIC VARIABLESGDP growth. Annual growth rate of quarterly real GDP serves as a proxy for 
demand factors in an economy. Higher GDP growth should be translated into 
higher demand for credit as both expectations of future developments and clients’ 
perceived creditworthiness improve. Moreover, we were looking into subcompo-
nents of GDP growth, particularly focusing on private Consumption growth. 
Macro factor. Although real GDP growth is a relatively suitable proxy of eco-
nomic development, this can also be described by other variables such as asset 
price growth, unemployment dynamics and growth in wages (as can be seen in 
Figure 2). Unfortunately, these variables are highly correlated to each other and 
therefore cannot be simultaneously included into the model. In order to capture 
the effect of the real cycle on credit growth as accurately as possible, we estimated 
a latent variable Macro factor that captures the dynamics of the real cycle. The 
macro factor was estimated by means of time series factor analysis using the fol-
lowing variables: real GDP growth, real estate price growth, stock exchange index 
growth (CROBEX) and nominal net wage growth. We use time series factor anal-
ysis8 to perform a reduction in the dimensionality of the data and combine several 
variables into a latent variable that represents a macroeconomic aggregate. 
3.4.2 BANK-SPECIFIC VARIABLES
Liquid Asset. The share of liquid assets in total assets represents the size of credit 
institutions’ liquidity conditions. Higher levels of liquidity in the previous period 
should translate into elevated lending activity in the following period. Nonethe-
less, this might also reflect banks’ willingness to take on risk, or their lack of it.
TCR. The bank total capital ratio represents the ratio between banks’ own funds 
and total risk weighted exposure. Banks with higher levels of TCR have higher 
credit potential as they are able to increase their credit exposure and still meet 
their regulatory capital requirement without the needs for recapitalization. There-
fore, the expected sign of the relation is positive. 
Market Share. Share of assets in total banking sector assets is a measure of a 
bank’s size. Market share is, in a way, a measure of bank inertia as it is much 
harder for larger banks to obtain high rates of credit growth than it is for smaller 
banks. Therefore, we expect a negative effect on credit growth. 
LT Liabilities. The ratio of  long-term liabilities to total liabilities, where liabilities 
are considered long-term if their initial maturity is longer than one year, is a meas-
ure of bank funds stability. 
RIIR on Liabilities. The real implicit interest rate on liabilities is calculated as 
ratio of interest rate expenditures in bank’s total liabilities. It is anticipated that 
higher cost of funding sources would have a negative effect on credit growth. 
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236 Substitutes. Year on year change in loans and debt securities to sectors other than 
HH’s and NFC’s, normalized by banks’ total assets in the previous year. This 
variable is used to test for the existence of the crowding-out effect that can occur 
if lending to government and other financial institutions reduces lending to private 
sector. This effect could be especially pronounced in crisis period, as creditworthi-
ness of private sector worsened while at the same time interest rates on sovereign 
loans and securities rose, which influenced some banks to increase sovereign 
lending. If the crowding-out effect is present, the expected sign is negative. 
NPLR. The non-performing loan ratio is a share of partly recoverable and fully irre-
coverable loans in total bank loans and represents banks’ loan quality. Increased 
share of distressed loans on banks’ balance sheets is expected to hamper future loan 
growth as they employ resources that could alternatively be used for granting new 
loans, so the expected sign is negative. In order to fully capture the effect of asset 
quality on future loan growth, the provisioned part of  NPLs (Coverage) should also 
be taken into account. The expected sign is positive as, conditional on a certain level 
of NPLR, NPLs with higher coverage ratio have smaller negative effect on bank 
capitalization and consequently on lending activity. Moreover, we also include a Net 
NPLR variable that represents the share of unprovisioned NPLs in total loans and 
the higher values of this variable should negatively affect credit activity.
ROA. Return on assets is a measure of bank profitability, defined as ratio of income 
before taxes and total bank assets. The expected sign is positive as banks with bet-
ter profitability can use their retained earnings to fund future loan expansion.
Table 1
































































mean 31.1 19.3 0.7 0.9 18.1 49.5  9.4 1.8 31.5 0.0
p25 23.7 13.5 0.2 -2.1  7.9 35.7  3.6 0.6 17.5 0.0
median 29.1 16.6 0.4 0.9 14.6 46.7  7.9 1.9 29.8 0.5




n mean 33.0 21.9 5.6 7.3 11.8 59.0  5.2 1.6 36.1 0.8
p25 24.5 14.9 0.3 -1.3  6.0 45.1  1.8 0.2 25.2 0.3
median 31.1 17.6 1.0 1.4 10.4 58.9  4.0 1.3 36.4 1.1




mean 32.1 20.8 3.4 4.5 14.6 54.8  7.1 1.7 34.0 0.4
p25 24.0 14.2 0.3 -1.7  6.6 39.7  2.3 0.4 20.4 0.1
median 30.1 17.1 0.5 1.2 11.8 54.0  5.3 1.6 34.5 0.8
p75 37.4 22.8 3.3 4.9 19.5 67.7  9.5 2.8 45.3 1.6
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2374 RESULTS 
4.1 IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF MP MEASURES ON BANK LENDING
The main results of the impact analysis explained above can be found in Figure 7 
and Table 2 below. Figure 7 clearly shows difference in banks’ reactions to the 
introduction of  MP measures according to whether it was a loosening or a tighten-
ing event. The analysis also shows that the reaction of foreign owned banks was 
more pronounced than that of domestically owned banks, which is in line with the 
systemic objective of macroprudential policy. This was the case in both loosening 
and tightening measures. It can be seen that a few periods prior to the introduction 
of policy tightening measures, banks reacted procyclically, that is they increased 
their lending in anticipation of regulatory tightening. This temporary lending 
surge gradually subsided in periods after the event and the same dynamics is 
observed both for domestic and foreign banks, whereas a lending surge is statisti-
cally significant only for foreign banks (Table 2). A similar reaction was also 
observed in cases in which the CNB introduced loosening measures; foreign and 
domestic banks slightly increased their lending immediately after the event, 
whereas foreign banks reacted in a more agile fashion than domestic banks. How-
ever, statistical significance tests do not reject the null hypothesis of CAAGR 
being equal to zero, which does not exclude the possibility that these measures 
had a more pronounced impact on banks’ lending in periods that took place after 
the event window. A third group of measures, labelled other, with ambiguous 
impacts and without a clear policy direction did not have a statistically significant 
impact on banks’ lending.
From the policymakers’ perspective, these results affirm the importance of MP 
measures implementation dynamics, especially in case of policy tightening. On 
one hand the policymaker should announce the measure long enough in advance 
in order to minimise potential shocks in the market, but on the other, the longer the 
period between announcement and implementation, the more the room for banks 
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238 Figure 7





















































Other and with ambiguous impact
Note: The size of the sample, i.e. the number of bank-event combinations used to estimate the 
CAAGR is marked in the figure.
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240 4.2 OVERALL IMPACT OF MP MEASURES ON BANK LENDING
The main results from panel regression analysis can be found in the tables below. 
In particular, Table 3 and 4 depict the estimated coefficients from equation (2), 
while the results for model 7 presented in these tables derive from equation (3). 
Furthermore, we also evaluated the effect of the global financial crisis and divided 
the sample into a pre-crisis (1999Q4-2008Q4) and a crisis period (2009Q1-2018Q3) 
for both bank sub-samples. These results are presented in Table 5. 
Table 3























































































































































































































































Observations 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,063
R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.38
Number of 
Banks 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
a MPP_stance_Home represents MPP stance from particular home country. 
Note: All RHS variables are lagged one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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241Table 4























































































































































































































































Observations 837 837 837 837 837 837 850
R-squared 0.27 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.31
Number of 
Banks 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
a MPP_stance_EU represents simple average of individual EU countries’ macroprudential policy 
stance indexes. 
Note: All RHS variables are lagged one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, * 0.05 < p < 0.1
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The results show that one of the major factors influencing loan growth in Croatia 
was the regulatory environment. The change in the MPP index, which captures the 
aggregate stance of macroprudential policy in Croatia, has a negative and signifi-
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242 lending. Tightening of the CNB’s macroprudential stance on average slowed 
down credit growth of foreign banks by 1 p.p. and for domestic ones only by 0.4 
p.p. The CNB’s macroprudential policy mix aimed at slowing down the buoyant 
credit growth can be rated as relatively more effective for foreign, mainly larger 
banks with systemic importance, which is in line with the objective of macropru-
dential measures, i.e. preserving the stability of the financial system. Furthermore, 
tightening of regulatory policies in home countries also has a significant negative 
effect on credit growth of foreign owned credit institutions in Croatia and that 
effect is comparable in size to the effect of domestic macroprudential policy 
actions. This result suggests that affiliated institutions’ host country regulatory 
environment affects the behaviour of banking groups at the consolidated level, 
which eventually spills over into host countries. What is more, the estimation 
results show that overall tightening of regulatory policies across EU countries also 
has an impact on the credit activity of domestic banks in Croatia, albeit at a lower 
intensity, suggesting that regulatory spillovers are present not only through direct 
the parent-daughter channel, but also through indirect channels. 
The relevant macroeconomic controls used in the specification mentioned above 
show a consistent significant positive impact on loan dynamics only for foreign 
banks. This is expected, as foreign banks are mainly larger banks with a relatively 
broad base of customers, while domestic banks are mainly smaller banks operat-
ing in specific niches that do not necessarily correlate with macroeconomic move-
ments. Moreover, when looking into different subcomponents of GDP, the only 
consistent driver of foreign bank loan growth is private consumption, as other 
subcomponents proved to be insignificant. Additionally, when accounting for 
other indicators of the real cycle, such as asset prices growth, unemployment 
dynamics and growth in wages, through the latent variable Macro factor, we find 
quite similar results. 
The complementary specifications robustly confirm that the unspecified macro 
effect is not present in the observed time period and that with macro variables 
included the model captured all the relevant information. 
As mentioned before, the effect of macroprudential policies can also be affected 
by different bank-specific variables. The results show that in order to extend 
credit, banks need to have sufficient liquidity. This is even more pronounced for 
domestic banks and can be explained by the ability of foreign owned banks to turn 
to their parent banks when in need of funding, while domestic banks, on the other 
hand, can increase credit supply only if they have sufficient liquidity reserves. 
Measures of capitalization, such as total capital ratio are significant only in the 
case of domestic banks. In addition, as expected, the further increase in credit 
institutions’ market share would have significantly negative effect on credit 
growth for both groups of banks. Moreover, the results do not corroborate the 
hypothesis that that a substitution effect between loans to private sector and place-
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243relation is significant it is positive. This suggests that on average, across the sam-
ple of all banks, a “crowding in” effect was observed, i.e. along with a growth in 
lending to the private sector, lending to government and other financial institu-
tions also increased. Furthermore, stable funding, measured as the share of long-
term liabilities in total liabilities is somewhat more relevant for domestic banks. 
On the other hand, the price of banks’ funding sources had a somewhat more sig-
nificantly negative effect on the credit growth of foreign banks, which is some-
what surprising, considering that domestic banks pay higher interest on their lia-
bilities than foreign banks. This result can be explained by the notion that rela-
tively small domestic banks value their relationships with clients more highly and 
are looking to extend a loan to that client despite the higher cost of its funding. We 
also tested how profitability affects credit growth and found out that higher profit-
ability is one of the main prerequisites for the credit expansion of domestic banks. 
Profitability proves to be insignificant in the case of foreign banks, which is not 
surprising because they can rely on their parent bank’s support, either by means of 
increasing liabilities or recapitalization. Asset quality, as documented by many 
studies in the literature, can have a limiting effect on credit growth. Interestingly 
results confirm that only domestic banks are constrained by the quality of their 
credit portfolio, while for foreign banks only the provisioned part of  NPLs is sta-
tistically significant in some specifications. The robustness of these findings was 
further verified by testing the relation between net NPLRs and credit growth, 
which yielded similar results. This is in line with our finding that the level of 
capitalization impacts lending only in case of domestic banks as domestic banks 
have on average somewhat lower levels of regulatory capital and need to watch 
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244 Table 5

















































































































































































































tions 443 443 609 609 364 364 473 473
R-squared 0.21 0.17 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.18
Number of 
Banks 17 17 17 17 14 14 14 14
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
a MPP_stance_Home for foreign banks represents MPP stance from particular home country, 
while MPP_stance_EU for domestic banks represents simple average of individual EU countries’ 
macroprudential policy stance indexes. 
Note: All RHS variables are lagged one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, * 0.05 < p < 0.1.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
When differentiating between the pre-crisis and the crisis period we find that CNB 
macroprudential actions primarily influenced foreign banks’ lending to the private 
sector in the years before the crisis. Furthermore, tightening of regulatory policies 
in home countries also had a significant negative effect on the credit growth of 
foreign-owned credit institutions in Croatia in the pre-crisis period. We also con-
firm macroprudential policy spillovers from EU countries onto domestic banks, 
but only for the pre-crisis period. Results show that loan dynamics for foreign 
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245between macroeconomic developments and credit growth is present only in the 
bust phase of the economic cycle and only for domestic banks. Furthermore, in 
post-crisis period foreign banks’ exposures to private and other sectors increased 
and/or contracted in a synchronized fashion. On the other hand, for domestic banks 
this holds true for the pre-crisis period. Results show that in the pre-crisis period 
domestic banks’ lending is negatively constrained by deteriorated asset quality and 
increased market share. The impact of liquidity on domestic banks’ credit growth 
is significant from 2009 onwards, when better profitability also become relevant. 
5 CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, macroprudential measures were 
labelled policymakers’ best response to systemic risk and financial sector imbal-
ances, with their effectiveness still largely unknown due to the limited use of such 
measures before the crisis. Croatia is a good example of a country that has 
employed a great variety of macroprudential measures to manage systemic risks in 
the economy, especially in the years before the 2008 financial crisis. In this paper, 
we analysed both the immediate and overall impact of macroprudential policies on 
foreign and domestic banks’ lending in Croatia in a 19 year period. According to 
estimation results, CNB macroprudential actions influenced banks’ lending to the 
private sector, primarily, however, affecting foreign banks’ lending, the effect on 
domestic banks being limited. However, these measures were primarily aimed at 
the supply side of lending and were not able fully to address the excessive borrow-
ing demand from the private sector, which through regulatory arbitrage induced 
stronger activity in other lending sources, outside of the Croatian banking sector. 
As a result, the private sector incurred relatively high debt levels and this poses 
one of the main hurdles that need to be resolved for a new lending cycle to be set 
in motion. Therefore, policy makers should actively monitor both the supply and 
the demand side of financial intermediation. Impact analysis shows that in a few 
periods prior to the introduction of policy tightening measures, banks’ reacted pro-
cyclically, that is they increased their lending in anticipation of regulatory tighten-
ing. At the same time, the tightening of regulatory policies in home countries also 
contributed negatively to foreign banks’ lending activity in Croatia, suggesting the 
presence of policy spillovers from other countries’ regulation, because foreign 
owned banks control 90% of total banking assets in Croatia. An additional impor-
tant finding is that regulatory spillovers impact not only foreign owned banks 
through the direct parent-daughter channel, but also other banks through indirect 
channels. This further emphasizes the importance of reciprocity arrangements and 
alignment of regulatory practices at the overall EU level.
The main conclusion of our study is that the macroprudential policies that have 
been heavily used in Croatia to deal with systemic risk have been relatively effec-
tive in stabilising credit growth. There is evidence that macroprudential policies 
have been effective in preventing the build-up of financial risks in particular for 
bigger banks mostly in foreign ownership. Moreover, there is some evidence that 
















































































44 (2) 221-249 (2020)
246 even though the CNB acted countercyclically, i.e. it loosened its macroprudential 
policy stance, the results show that the effectiveness of these measures in the crisis 
period were not as effective as in the pre-crisis period. Findings further reveal the 
dissimilar impact of MP measures on banks’ lending with regards to their direc-
tion, i.e. tightening or loosening, and policy makers should bear this in mind when 
opting for tightening of their policy stance as the reversal of that action may not 
match the initial impact of the measure’s introduction. These results affirm the 
importance of MP measures implementation dynamics, especially in the case of 
policy tightening, as policy makers have to find an optimal strategy that minimises 
room for banks to make a lending push before a measure enters into force, while 
avoiding causing shocks in the market. In other words, policymakers should be 
encouraged by the impact of macroprudential measures in the upturn phase of 
financial cycle, but also be aware of their limitations in the downturn phase of 
cycle. As far as the results indicate, after a crisis has occurred, in order to revive 
the financial intermediation of banks, one cannot rely only on the loosening of 
macroprudential policy, as other policies need to be involved. 
As a final point, our results suggest that the choice of the macroprudential instru-
ment is non-trivial and should take into account the asymmetric effects of each 
instrument in order to utilize the most effective policy at hand for the chosen 
objective. Therefore, further exploration of this topic would be great public inter-
est. In analysing the interconnectedness of macroprudential topics with other 
policies and their different effect in the boom and bust phases of the economy, 
data that are more granular would be required. Filling the, still existing, data gaps 
would also help to develop mechanisms to identify and monitor overall country 
systemic risk and measure efficiency in a more detailed approach, measure by 
measure, which is essential to make macroprudential policy operational.
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